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Introduction
The American military is in a well-publicized struggle to address its
sexual assault problem. After the Tailhook scandal in 1991, military
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leaders repeatedly and publically assured Congress that they would change
the culture that previously condoned sexual discrimination and turned a
blind eye to sexual assault. Over the past two decades, new sexual assault
scandals have been followed by familiar assurances and Congress’s
patience has finally run out. As a result, the Uniform Code of Military
Justice is currently undergoing its most significant restructuring since it
went into effect in 1951.
The central issue is who is going to run the military justice system:
military commanders, or someone else. As it stands, military commanders
(also called convening authorities) make the ultimate decision on whether a
case goes to trial.1 Commanders receive the advice of military lawyers
throughout the process and routinely follow that advice, but they do not
have to.
This reform effort is based on the assumption that commanders look at
sexual assault cases differently than other cases. Critics say that those who
run the military justice system have a bias against the victims in these cases,
where that bias is likely related to some form of sexism. 2 Critics claim that
when faced with the decision to prosecute these sexual assault cases,
commanders face a conflict between their loyalty to someone that otherwise
looks like a good soldier3 and their duty to seek justice for a victim who
may have behaved in ways that commanders disapprove of, like liberal
sexual behavior or prohibited conduct like underage drinking.4
This article explores that problem. Why is it that those in the military
say they are taking the problem seriously, but after more than twenty years,
it does not seem like much has changed? To answer this question, we need
to understand how people cognitively process legal problems that involve
rape. If there are problems within that cognitive process, and if those

1. See LAWRENCE J. MORRIS, MILITARY JUSTICE: A GUIDE TO THE ISSUES 41, 45, 47–
48 (2010).
2. See generally Regina F. Titunik, The Myth of the Macho Military, 40 POLITY 137,
144–45 (2008). I am not exploring whether there is a rape culture in the military in that there
is a higher percentage of rapists in the military than in the general public, either because
rapists are attracted to the military or there is something about military culture that changes
men who otherwise would not rape into rapists. For a thorough discussion of this issue, see
generally Madeline Morris, By Force of Arms: Rape, War, and Military Culture, 45 DUKE L.
J. 651 (1996).
3. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY 64–65 (2013),
available
at
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/09242013_Statutory_Enforcement_Report_Sexual_Assault_in_t
he_Military.pdf.
4. See generally id., at 31–39.
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problems are amplified within the military population, then that could be
the source of the critics’ concerns.
Part I provides background on social cognition and defines the rape
problem that we will address. Part II identifies two potential groups (those
with traditional gender role expectations and who label themselves as
conservative) that tend subscribe to certain beliefs about rape; discusses
how those belief systems work to control behavior within those groups; and
then drills down to the particular cognitively processes that people use to
resolve these legal problems, focusing on how people actually use those
beliefs about rape to get to an answer. Part III explains that those beliefs
about rape are inaccurate, which leads to a faulty legal reasoning process.
Part IV first shows social cognition principles still apply in the military
context. This section then presents data from two studies that suggests that
the military population that handles sexual cases and that develops sexual
assault policy is more traditional and more conservative than the general
population and so would be more likely to use inaccurate rape beliefs. This
section also shows that several inaccurate rape beliefs are amplified in the
military context.
From that, it appears that the critics appear to be right. Those in the
military who are responsible for the rape problem do not fully understand it.
They have difficulty recognizing that a good soldier might be a rapist, and
that a woman who “parties” might be a victim. They cannot see the
problem for what it really is. They have a blind spot.
Part V concludes by discussing how this research can inform the
public policy debate about who should run the military justice system. The
primary criteria for deciding who will have responsibility for military
justicefrom the investigator to the person exercising prosecutorial
discretion to the panel member or jurormust be designed to identify and
minimize this blind spot. The issue is not whether the person responsible is
a civilian or in the militarythe issue is whether that person will use
inaccurate rape beliefs when resolving these cases.
I. Background
A. Overview of Social Cognition
Social cognition is “the process by which people think about and make
sense of other people, themselves, and social situations.”5 Within the
5.

SUSAN T. FISKE, SOCIAL BEINGS: CORE MOTIVES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 123 (3d
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broader field of social cognition, the social identity perspective provides a
useful framework for understanding how people make sense of social
situations.6 Generally speaking, people group themselves together based on
shared, distinguishing features.7 Those within a group are “motivated to
emphasize and secure the ways in which their group is positively distinct
from other groups.”8
These group categories “provide[] a way of organizing socially
relevant information, and help[] in the process of both understanding and
predicting behavior.”9 People tend to have more positive expectations
about the group to which they belong (the “ingroup”) than to the groups to
which they do not (the “outgroup”).10 Those within the ingroup share
generalizations and social schemas about human behavior: “Through the
process of self-categorization, the individual constructs the meaning of this
social identity, along with adopting the norms (appropriate behavior)
guiding performance in this particular group.”11 These expectations help to
form group cohesion within those ingroups.12
Those in the ingroup may “stigmatize others who threaten the effective
functioning of their own group”,13 people like counter-socializers who
“undermine ingroup values”14 and threaten the ingroup’s sense of control.
Those in the outgroup pose a threat to the ingroup, and the shared
generalizations that the ingroup has about the outgroup “creates a sense of
ingroup prediction and possibly control over external threats” and “also
protects the ingroup's superior position, maintaining status and power”.15
ed. 2014).
6. See generally Matthew J. Hornsey, Social Identity Theory and Self-categorization
Theory: A Historical Review, 2 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 204 (2008).
7. Namoi Ellemers & S. Alexander Haslam, Social Identity Theory, in HANDBOOK OF
THEORIES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: VOLUME II 379, 380 (Paul A.M. Van Lange et al. eds.,
2012).
8. Id., at 382.
9. Id., at 381.
10. FISKE, supra note 5, at 420, 426.
11. Russell F. Korte, A Review of Social Identity Theory with Implications for
Training and Development, 31 J. EUR. INDUSTRIAL TRAINING 166, 169 (2007); see generally
FISKE, supra note 5, at 155, 420; John C. Turner & Katherine J. Reynolds, SelfCategorization Theory, in HANDBOOK OF THEORIES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: VOLUME II 399,
406 (Paul A.M. Van Lange et al. eds., 2012).
12. FISKE, supra note 5, at 424–25.
13. Id., at 425.
14. Id., at 425.
15. Id. at 426.
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The discrete social schemas include expectations about specific kinds
of people and the social roles they play16 (a brain, an athlete, a basket-case,
a princess, and a criminal).17 Social schemas also include expectations
about social events, often called scripts.18 These are the expectations about
what happens and in what sequence during social situations, like going out
to dinner or having a consensual sexual encounter.
People use these social schemas to solve legal problems. Within a
limited information environment, legal problem solvers have to use
inferences to get from the limited information to the required conclusions or
outcome judgments.19 The building blocks for these inferences are those
social schemasthe person’s expectations or generalizations about how the
world works.20
When solving these legal problems, people take the available
information and then use their schemas to construct a story (or hypothesis)
that makes sense.21 People then test the conflicting stories presented in the
case against that story hypothesis to determine which of those conflicting
stories is likely to be true.22 If information does not exist, the person will
likely infer that facts did exist that are consistent with these schemas. Note
that if the underlying schemas that people use to generate these hypotheses
are inaccurate, the reasoning process will be compromised.
Heuristics are inferential shortcuts used to evaluate an event and arrive
at the required outcome judgment. People often use the representativeness
heuristic, which is judging the probability that an event happened based on
its similarity to those schemas.23 If the event matches the schemas, then the
event very likely happened. If the event does not match the schemas, then
the event very likely did not happen.24
16. Id. at 154; Albert J. Moore, Trial by Schema: Cognitive Filters in the Courtroom,
37 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 273, 281 (1989).
17. THE BREAKFAST CLUB (Universal Pictures 1985).
18. FISKE, supra note 5, at 155–56.
19. See generally FISKE, supra note 5, at 138; Moore, supra note 16, at 280.
20. See generally FISKE, supra note 5, at 151–53, 420; MICHAEL W. EYSENCK & MARK
T. KEANE, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY: A STUDENT’S HANDBOOK 501, 504–05 (6th ed. 2010);
Moore, supra note 16, at 279–80.
21. See generally FISKE, supra note 5, at 141; EYSENCK & KEANE, supra note 20, at
501, 504–05; Moore, supra note 16, at 279–80.
22. See generally Moore, supra note 16, at 279–80.
23. FISKE, supra note 5, at 142; Moore, supra note 16, at 285–86. “According to the
logic of the representativeness heuristic, a story is believable if it is similar to the [person]’s
actual or vicarious experiences.” Id. at 276.
24. See generally Moore, supra note 16, at 293–300.
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When solving problems, these schemas guide people toward outcome
judgments that are consistent with their ingroup identity, that minimize
their own cognitive dissonance, and that minimize conflict within their
cultural group.25 Further, these schemas guide people toward outcome
judgments that are consistent with just world theory, which is the idea that
“good things happen to good people and bad things happen only to those
who deserve them.”26 The idea is that when faced with the task of solving
problems like these, people will solve them in a way that makes them feel
safe in the world around them. If the outcome judgment is consistent with
the idea that bad things only happen to people from the outgroup, then the
problem solver feels safe because she is in the ingroup and so that bad thing
cannot happen to her.
The basic model, then, is that those in the ingroup tend to share norms
and schemas about social behavior. When presented with a legal problem
in a limited information environment, these people will use those schemas
to arrive at an outcome judgment that is consistent with their group
identities and worldviews.
Deciding what happened in a sexual assault case is a social cognition
problem. In a rape case, the legal problem solver has to make sense of the
social actions of unfamiliar people and has to make sense of a social
situation for which there are probably no outside witnesses. We should
expect that the problem solver will need to rely on social schemas to solve
the problem, will use the social schemas that reflect their group identity,
and will solve the problem in a way that is consistent with that group
identity.
B. What Kind of Rape Are We Talking About?
Throughout this article I will use “rape” and “sexual assault”
interchangeably to describe penetrative, non-consensual sexual acts.
However, when I use those terms, I will be focusing on a subset of rapes or
25. Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and Why,
in Acquaintance-Rape Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 732 (2010); see generally FISKE,
supra note 5, at 249–55, 426–27; Michael A. Hogg et al., A Tale of Two Theories: A Critical
Comparison of Identity Theory with Social Identity Theory, 58 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 255, 257
(1995).
26. Kimberly A. Lonsway & Louise F. Fitzgerald, Rape Myths: In Review, 18
PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 133, 136 (1999) [hereinafter Rape Myths]; see also Mark A. Whatley,
Victim Characteristics Influencing Attributions of Responsibility to Rape Victims: A MetaAnalysis, 1 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 81, 83 (1996).
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sexual assaults. I will be focusing on sexual assault by an adult man of an
adult woman27 where society would recognize that consensual sex between
those two is plausible. This category includes assaults by offenders who
are friends, acquaintances, current and former dates and boyfriends, current
and former husbands, employers, fellow employees, and the like. Research
suggests that this category makes up roughly half to three-quarters of all
rapes.28 This category excludes the remaining rapes that are committed by
offenders who are otherwise related to the victim (fathers, step-fathers,
uncles, etc.) or who are strangers.
This is the category that the military’s critics have in mind: male
service members assaulting female service members, as employers, coworkers, dates, friends, acquaintances. To the critics, this is the category
that the military does not take seriously.
This category is difficult to name. It is narrower than “non-stranger”
and broader than “acquaintance” or “date.” And the real dividing line is not
related to the type of offender or the characteristics of the victim, but
whether an outsider might think that consent was a possibility. We
generally do not think consent is relevant in incest or stranger rape, but we
do for the rest.
In this “consent is relevant” category, the basic legal conflicts are
whether the woman consented, and if she did not consent, whether the man
was reasonably mistaken about that lack of consent. While force is still an
element of rape in many statutes, in the common law force really just
served a notice function (if the man has to use that much force, enough to
overcome reasonable resistance, then he was on notice that the woman was
not consenting and so could not be reasonably mistaken)29 and in many

27. Recognizing that men are also victims of sexual assault and women can commit
sexual assault, this article is limited to a discussion of men assaulting women. In 2013, 86%
of the victims who filed unrestricted reports in the Department of Defense were female.
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY 90 (2013). Only
3% of the subjects in completed investigations were female. Id. at 92.
28. Estimates are that 10–16% of women will be sexually assaulted in their lifetime.
See generally JODY RAPHAEL, RAPE IS RAPE 86 (2013). In one study, victims reported the
following relationships with their offenders: stranger, 22%; father or step-father, 11%; other
relatives, 16%; boyfriend or ex-boyfriend, 10%; other non-stranger, non-relatives, 29%.
NATI’L VICTIM CTR., RAPE IN AMERICA: A REPORT TO THE NATION 4 (1992). Another study
of forcible rapes found the following relationships: stranger, 6%; husbands and ex-husbands,
3%; fathers, step-fathers, and other relatives, 19%; boyfriends, 26%; friend and classmates,
29%; other nonrelatives, 15%.
DEAN G. KIPATRICK ET AL., DRUG-FACILITATED,
INCAPACITATED, AND FORCIBLE RAPE: A NATIONAL SURVEY 30–31 (2007).
29. Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1107–08, 1131 (1986).
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modern statutes force now serves as an aggravating factor.30 The central
legal issues are consent and mistake as to consent.
II. Social Cognition in Legal Problems Involving Rape
To solve the central legal issues of consent or mistake as to consent,
people use social schemas that are consistent with their group identities and
choose outcome judgments that will minimize dissonance and leave them
feeling safe within the world.
Unfortunately, many of those
schemascommonly called rape mythsare inaccurate.
Kimberly
Lonsway and Louise Fitzgerald define rape myths as those attitudes and
beliefs about sexual assault “that are generally false but are widely and
persistently held, and that serve to deny and justify male sexual aggression
against women.”31 The first part of that definition describes the schemas
while the second describes the function served by those schemas: ingroup
control of an outgroup.
A. The Ingroups
Lonsway and Fitzgerald reviewed rape myth acceptance literature and
identified a potential ingroup: those who hold traditional gender role
beliefs.32 To the extent that “traditional gender role beliefs” constitutes a
measurable global construct,33 that construct has many facets.
30. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 794.011 (2014).
31. Lonsway & Fitzgerald, Rape Myths, supra note 26, at 134 (emphasis omitted).
32. Id., at 155.
33. Several scales measure traditional sex roles belief: the Sex Role Stereotyping
scale (SRS), Martha R. Burt, Cultural Myths and Supports for Rape, 38 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 217 (1980) [hereinafter Cultural Myths and Supports for Rape]; the
Ambivalent Sexism Inventory – Benign Sexism (ASI-BS), Peter Glick & Susan T. Fiske,
The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory: Differentiating Hostile and Benevolent Sexism, 70 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 491 (1996) [hereinafter The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory];
the Attitudes Toward Women Scale (AWS), Janet T. Spence et al., A Short Version of the
Attitudes toward Women Scale (AWS), 2 BULL. PSYCONOMIC SOC'Y 218 (1973); the Sex-Role
Egalitarianism Scale (SRES), Carole A. Beere et al., The Sex-Role Egalitarian Scale: A
Measure of Attitudes Toward Equality Between the Sexes, 10 SEX ROLES 563 (1984), Lynda
A. King & Daniel W. King, Sex-Role Egalitarianism Scale: Development, Psychometric
Properties, and Recommendations for Future Research, 21 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 71 (1997);
the Gender Role Beliefs Scale (GRBS), Paula S. Kerr & Ronald R. Holden, Development of
the Gender Role Beliefs Scale (GRBS), 11 J. SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 3 (1996); the
Sexist Attitudes Toward Women Scale (SATWS), Peter L. Benson & Steven Vincent,
Development and Validation of the Sexist Attitudes Toward Women Scale (SATWS), 5
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Those who hold traditional gender role beliefs may believe that the
family should be structured as a patriarchy, where the man ultimately
makes the important decisions.34 They may also believe that, even if
decisions should be made equally, the family labor should be divided such
that women should work at home, possibly believing that women are better
caregivers for the children and better at managing the household, while men
have higher income earning potential (or both).35 One step beyond that
(and possibly more hostile) is that women should not have an equal role in
male-dominated occupations.36
Another facet encompasses the courtship ritual, with the expectation
that the man is the aggressive pursuer while the woman is passive and
chooses among those who are pursuing her.37 Last, a facet could be sexual
conservatism, or more accurately, female sexual conservatismthat is,
“restrictions on the appropriateness of sexual partners, sexual acts,
conditions or circumstances under which sex should occur, and so on.”38
Very likely, sexual conservatism is measured by a subconstruct of Peter
Glick and Susan Fiske’s Benign Sexism scale, which they label
“complimentary gender differentiation.”39 This is the idea that women are
pure, moral, and ladylike and we should respect that femininity.40 Women
who are pure, moral, and ladylike are on one end of the spectrum. The
sexually liberated are on the other.
Note that traditional gender role beliefs differ from hostile sexism.
Hostile sexism is based on beliefs that women are inferior, and on hostile
emotions toward women.41 Traditional sex role beliefs (or benevolent or
PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 276 (1980); and the Neosexism Scale, Francine Tougas, Neosexism:
Plus Ca Change, Plus C'est Pareil, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 842 (1995).
34. The SRS, SRES, AWS, GRBS, and SATWS all contain an item that reflects this
facet.
35. See Peter Glick & Susan T. Fiske, An Ambivalent Alliance: Hostile and Benevolent
Sexism as Complementary Justifications for Gender Inequality, 56 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 109,
110 (2001) [hereinafter An Ambivalent Alliance]. The SRS, AWS, SRES, GRBS, SATWS
all contain items that test this facet.
36. The SRES, AWS, GRBS, and SATWS contain items that measure this facet. The
Neosexism scale measures this facet more directly.
37. The SRS, SRES, and GRBS all contain items that measure this facet.
38. Cultural Myths and Supports for Rape, supra note 33, at 219. Scales with items
that test sexual conservatism include the AWS, GRBS, and SATWS.
39. An Ambivalent Alliance, supra note 35, at 111.
40. The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory, supra note 353, at 512. The SRS, GRBS,
SATWS also contain items that measure this facet.
41. Gordon B. Forbes et al., First—and Second—Generation Measures of Sexism,
Rape Myths and Related Beliefs, and Hostility Toward Women, 10 VIOLENCE AGAINST
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benign sexism) are based on beliefs about the best roles for each sex and on
positive emotions related to protection, being protected, and affection.42
Both hostile and benevolent sexism perpetuate patriarchy: “Hostile sexist
beliefs in women’s incompetence at agentic tasks characterize women as
unfit to wield power over economic, legal, and political institutions,
whereas benevolent sexism provides a comfortable rationalization for
confining women to domestic roles.”43 Benevolent sexism “promises that
men’s power will be used to women’s advantage”44 by securing women
protection and providing them comforts.
When looking at the “nomological net” of rape myth acceptance,
Lonsway and Fitzgerald found “at its core gender, traditional gender role
attitudes [and] negative attitudes toward women”.45
Lonsway and
Fitzgerald also found that the “critical construct in understanding rape myth
acceptance is a general hostility toward women.”46 Generally, this has to
do with the male actors (the rapists) in the events, and not those who judge
the events. The relationship between men who score high on hostile sexism
scales and their involvement in coercive sexual assault experiences is well
established.47
However, for our purposes, overtly hostile sexists and misogynists are
not the relevant ingroup. They may make up a small group (which might
have a higher percentage of rapists) but they are now an outgroup. It is
unlikely that those who are charged with solving these legal problems
(investigators, district attorneys, judges, and jurors), with a narrow focus on
consent or mistake of fact about consent would use overtly misogynistic
schemas to solve those problems any more than they would rely on overtly
racist schemas to solve other legal problems.48 The outliers who do rely on
these beliefs are exposed and ridiculed.49
WOMEN 236, 240 (2004); An Ambivalent Alliance, supra note 35, at 110.
42. See The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory, supra note 353, at 491; see also An
Ambivalent Alliance, supra note 35; Forbes et al., supra note 41, at 239.
43. The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory, supra note 42, at 492.
44. An Ambivalent Alliance, supra note 35, at 111.
45. Rape Myths, supra note 26, at 155.
46. Kimberly A. Lonsway & Louise F. Fitzgerald, Attitudinal Antecedents of Rape
Myth Acceptance: A Theoretical and Empirical Reexamination, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 704, 705 (1995); see generally Forbes et al., supra note 41, at 240–42.
47. See Forbes et al., supra note 41, at 251; Eliana Suarez & Tahany M. Gadalla, Stop
Blaming the Victim: A Meta-Analysis on Rape Myths, 25 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 2010,
2025 (2010).
48. See generally Forbes et al., supra note 41, at 238.
49. See, e.g., Judge Publically Reprimanded Over Teen Rape Comments, CBS NEWS
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While men tend to accept inaccurate rape schemas more than women,
men as a category are not the relevant ingroup, either. Glick and Fiske
argue that the unique relationship between men and women, where both
need each other and where women share dyadic power, prevents an
ingroup/outgroup separation along sex lines.50 Men do not feel like they are
exploiting women (they are providing for and protecting them) and women
in this ingroup do not feel exploited (they play an important social role and
are protected).
Rather, the potential ingroup consists of those who share those
traditional gender role beliefs, both men and women,51 while the outgroup
consists of those who threaten itthose with nontraditional gender role
beliefs.52
Another potential ingroup/outgroup divide is conservatism. This
construct has three major facets: status-quo conservatism (“an enduring
inclination to favor stability and preservation of the status quo over social
change”); laissez-faire conservatism (“persistent preference for a free
market and limited government intervention in the economy”) and social
conservatism (“an enduring predisposition, in all matters political and
social, to favor obedience and conformity (oneness and sameness) over
freedom and difference.”53 That last facet, social conservatism, includes an
(Jul. 22, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/montana-judge-to-be-publicly-reprimandedover-teen-rape-comments/; Debra Cassens Weiss, Judge Sentences Rapist to Community
Service at Rape Crisis Center; Says Victim, 14, Wasn’t Virgin, ABA J. (May 6, 2014),
http://www.abajournal.com/mobile/article/judge_sentences_rapist_to_community_service_at
_rape_crisis_center_says_vict; Kristine Guerra, Controversial Rape Sentence Puts Judge in
Spotlight, USA TODAY (May 27, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
nation/2014/05/27/judge-rape-sentence-home-detention/9630267/.
50. The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory, supra note 33, at 492. Glick and Fiske theorize
that because sexism includes both a subtle, hostile component and a benign component, that
sexism is ambivalent. Id. at 491–92. They developed the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory
which contains two subscales, Hostile Sexism (ASI-HS) and Benevolent Sexism (ASI-BS).
Id. at 500. Their ASI-HS scale is not measuring overtly misogynistic and adversarial beliefs
like those measured by Martha Burt’s Adversarial Sexual Beliefs scale—it measures much
more subtle (but hostile) beliefs. See also Cultural Myths and Supports for Rape, supra note
33, at 219.
51. The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory, supra note 42, at 507; Kathryn B. Anderson et
al., Individual Differences and Attitudes Toward Rape: A Meta-Analytic Review, 23
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 295, 312 (1997).
52. The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory, supra note 42, at 492.
53. Karen Stenner, Three Kinds of “Conservatism”, 20 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 142, 142
(2009). Two scales, the Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale and the Social Dominance
Orientation Scale, are often used to measure facets of conservatism. See generally Bernard
E. Whitley, Jr., Right-Wing Authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation, and Prejudice,
77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 126 (1999).
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anti-hedonist component,54 which is a “tendency to regard pleasure as
necessarily bad or ‘sinful’ . . . This applies particularly to sex . . . .”55
While these two ingroup constructs do not perfectly overlap, the
constructs do share conceptual common ground. Social conservatism, a
facet of conservatism, likely includes a facet related to traditional gender
role beliefs, where social conservatism serves as an emergent variable with
traditional gender role beliefs as a sub-facet. In particular, a facet of social
conservatism (sexual conservatism or anti-hedonism) overlaps with a facet
of benign sexism or traditional gender role expectations (sexual
conservatism or complimentary gender differentiation). We should expect
that the constructs of conservatism and traditional gender role beliefs will
be correlated, and conservatism has been found to be highly correlated with
traditional sex role beliefs.56
B. Group Membership, Rape Schema Acceptance, and Legal Control
Members of the ingroup identify with each other according to their
beliefs and these larger belief systems translate into discrete schemas that
serve to enforce that group cohesion. Here, the ingroup consists of those
who share beliefs about how men and women should behave and those who
are conservative, where the two likely overlap and where sexual
conservatism plays a central role. Not surprisingly, those with traditional
gender role beliefs tend to endorse certain rape schemas more than those
with non-traditional gender role beliefs,57 as do those with conservative
worldviews compared to those with liberal worldviews.58
54. Glenn D. Wilson, The Factor Structure of the C-Scale, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
CONSERVATISM 89 (Glenn D. Wilson ed., 1973).
55. Glenn D. Wilson, The Concept of Conservatism, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
CONSERVATISM 8 (Glenn D. Wilson ed., 1973).
56. Knud S. Larsen & Ed Long, Attitudes Toward Sex Roles: Traditional or
Egalitarian?, 19 SEX ROLES 1, 10 (1988); William D. Walker et al., Authoritarianism and
Sexual Aggression, J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1036, 1038 (1993) (using the Right
Wing Authoritarianism scale).
57. See Dominic Abrams et al., Perceptions of Stranger and Acquaintance Rape: The
Role of Benevolent and Hostile Sexism in Victim Blame and Rape Proclivity, 84 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 111, 111 (2003) (noting the correlation between ASI-BS and
RMA); Anderson et al., supra note 51, at 312; Forbes et al., supra note 41, at 250 (linking
Neosexism, AWS, and for women only, ASI-BS); G. Tendayi Viki & Dominic Abrams, But
She Was Unfaithful: Benevolent Sexism and Reactions to Rape Victims Who Violate
Traditional Gender Role Expectations, 47 SEX ROLES 289 (2002) (noting a correlation
between ASI-BS to RMA).
58. Anderson et al., supra note 51, at 312; Walker et al., supra note 56, at 1037–38
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These rape schemas fall into two broad categories: schemas that
excuse the man, and schemas that blame the woman. Schemas that excuse
the man include schemas related to beliefs that only deviant men rape, and
therefore normal-looking men do not mean to rape anyone. Schemas that
blame the woman include schemas related to beliefs that women ask for it
by the way they behave sexually, or that women secretly want to be forced
to have intercourse. Some schemas connect two. These are beliefs that
women consent to sex (as shown by their other sexual behavior) but then lie
about it afterward.59
In a broad sense, these generalizations about how men and women
behave control behavior within the ingroup.60 For example, “Benevolent
sexism is directed toward traditional women who adhere to narrow gender
roles: housewives, in particular . . . [Sexism] support[s] the status quo for
women, by rewarding subordinate women with male protection and
appreciation for their alleged purity but threatening uppity women with
dislike and exclusion.”61 Further, “The correlation between [sexist] beliefs
and acceptance of rape myths probably reflects the self-protection
perception that women who follow traditional roles will be protected by
men and that only women who depart from these roles are victims of
rape.”62
Building on Glick and Fiske’s subconstructs within the Ambivalent
Sexism Inventory and Ambivalence Toward Men Inventory, Kristine
Chapleau and her colleagues hypothesized that “it might be the case that
some people are tougher on rape victims and more lenient toward rapists
because they believe that women should be ladies.”63 They found that the
subcomponent that women should behave like ladies was responsible for
the association between benevolent sexism toward women and rape myth

(using the Right Wing Authoritarianism scale).
59. See generally Diana L. Payne et al., Rape Myth Acceptance: Exploration of Its
Structure and Its Measurement Using the Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance Scale, 33 J. RES.
PERSONALITY 27 (1999); Martha Burt, Rape Myths and Acquaintance Rape, in
ACQUAINTANCE RAPE: THE HIDDEN CRIME 27 (Andrea Parrot & Laurie Bechhofer eds.,
1991). The scale items used in the Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance Scale are examples of the
discrete schemas.
60. FISKE, supra note 5, at 442–43.
61. FISKE, supra note 5, at 436–37.
62. Forbes et al., supra note 41, at 250.
63. Kristine M. Chapleau et al., How Ambivalent Sexism Toward Women and Men
Support Rape Myth Acceptance, 57 SEX ROLES 131, 132 (2007).
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acceptance64which is consistent with this being a marker of which
women are ingroup (the ladylike) and which are outgroup (the un-ladylike).
They also hypothesized that some people are tougher on rape victims
and more lenient toward rapists because they believe that “men are
chivalrous toward women and thus would not act inappropriately unless
invited by the woman”.65 They found that a subcomponent of benevolent
sexism toward men, “the belief that a woman is incomplete without the love
of a man” was the strongest predictor for rape myth acceptance among
those subcomponents, and that “suggests that participants may view the
aggressor as a potential romantic partner, rather than a rapist.”66 Further,
participants who responded positively to a subcomponent that measured
admiration for men “for their masculine attributes of strength, risk-taking,
and stoicism are less likely to hold men accountable for rape.”67 Both of
these are consistent with attitudes toward ingroup menmen with those
features are “good” guys.
For conservatism, these schemas also enhance ingroup cohesion and
outgroup control. The authors of one study suggest that this is because
“conservative political ideologies that place the responsibility on the
individual for his or her plight may lead one to believe in women’s
responsibility for sexual victimization.”68
One mechanism for this social control is the law. Those schemas and
the operationalization of those schemas within the legal system (by not
pursuing charges against the man or by acquitting him) allow the ingroup to
control both its members and the outgroup members.69 The social contract
is: Men, if you behave in the way we expect (stay ingroup, do not jump out
of the bushes and attack women), then we will extend you the fullest
protection of the law. You have to really mess up (have an unreasonable
belief that the woman is not consenting) before you will face sanctions.
And women, if you behave in ways we do not approve of (you follow
non-traditional gender roles or are sexually liberal), then in most cases, we
will not extend you the protection of the lawwe will infer that you
consented and are lying, or that you behaved in a way that a good guy
64. Id. at 135.
65. Id. at 132.
66. Id. at 135.
67. Id. at 135–36.
68. Anderson et al., supra note 51, at 312.
69. See generally Kristine M. Chapleau & Debra L. Oswald, A System Justification
View of Sexual Violence: Legitimizing Gender Inequality and Reduced Moral Outrage Are
Connected to Greater Rape Myth Acceptance, 15 J. TRAUMA & DISSOCIATION 204 (2014).
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would reasonably misinterpret. If you want the protection of the law, you
better behave the way we want you to.
C. Rape Schemas in Legal Problem Solving
These abstract reasoning systems become concrete when someone
within the ingroup needs to solve a particular sexual assault problem.
When we look at the various rape myths identified by Diana Payne and
colleagues70 from the prospective of people from the ingroup who have
figure out how a good, ingroup man was accused of rape, patterns emerge.
The central rape schema is an event schema about what “real” rape
looks like: “real” rape involves a deviant man who uses violence and
weapons against a woman who is a stranger, causing injuries in the
process.71 And it is reinforced by person schemas about rapists. “Real”
rapists come from the outgroup: they are violent, sexual deviants. When
good, ingroup women get raped, it is by those outgroup men. The corollary
to this central rape schema is the schema that ingroup men (good, normal
guys) do not rape.
When the problem solver uses the schema that only deviants rape and
is then presented with a defendant who does not look like a deviantin
fact, is from the ingroupthe problem solver likely forms the hypothesis
that this man could not be a rapist. Therefore, either the man made a
mistake or the woman really did consent.
While we should not expect the legal problem solvers will disregard
the law, we should expect that they will be very cautious when given a case
70. For this discussion, I am relying on the Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance Scale
found in Payne et al., supra note 59 and Sarah McMahan & G. Lawrence Farmer, An
Updated Measure for Assessing Subtle Rape Myths, 35 SOC. WORK RES. 71 (2011). Diane
Payne and colleagues used exhaustive factor analysis to categorize forty rape schemas into
seven categories. Sarah McMahan and Lawrence Farmer later conducted focus group
testing on Payne’s scale and dropped three categories, two of which I am also not going to
focus on. Id. at 74. The first is the myth that rape is a trivial event. That category presumes
that a rape had occurred but that the rape was not socially significant; however, in this
article, I am focusing on schemas that help people decide whether a rape has occurred. I
also am not going to focus on the rape schema that women want to be forced into sex. While
this rape schema still occasionally pops up in popular culture, in the McMahan and Farmer
study, the focus groups said that these views were now outdated and too overtly sexist. Id.
The interesting thing about this latter category is that it represented a justification for
ingroup rape of ingroup women, rather than ingroup rape of outgroup women. The idea is
that “good” women want to be overpowered by “good” men, like Scarlett O’Hara was by
Rhett Butler.
71. Burt, supra note 59, at 27.
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involving an ingroup man. In a society where sex role socialization teaches
men to take the risk in sexual situations,72 those in the ingroup would want
to give the man every benefit when reviewing the facts. He is, after all, one
of them.73
Many of the rape schemas serve to reinforce the hypothesis of mistake
as to consent. The mistake hypothesis has two components: either some
outside condition prevented the man from being able to understand signs of
non-consent; or the woman’s signs were not clear enough (or some
combination of both).
Toward the “outside conditions” mistake, these schemas include, “A
good, normal guy sometimes cannot control his sexual urges after a woman
has turned him on.” In that case, the schema is that a man can involuntarily
lose control of himself when his sex drive reaches a tipping point and so not
be able to notice that the woman is not consenting. According to the
ingroup problem solver, that would be a reasonable mistake for a good guy
to make.
Another outside condition is alcohol. These schemas are, “If a man is
drunk, he probably does not know what he is doing,” or, “If both people are
drunk, then they are both responsible for what happens.”74 The reasoning is
the samea good but drunk man is not able to understand that a woman is
not consenting, and according to the ingroup problem solver, that would be
a reasonable mistake for a good guy to make.
The “unclear signs” or miscommunication schemas revolve around the
generalization that good guys sometimes do not understand when a woman
says no. One is the schema that “Women who behave in non-traditional
72. Amy Grubb & Emily Turner, Attribution of Blame in Rape Cases: A Review of the
Impact of Rape Myth Acceptance, Gender Role Conformity, and Substance Use on Victim
Blaming, 17 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 443, 446 (2012).
73. For example, in a recent opinion by the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal
Appeals in a non-stranger rape case, the court said:
Although we recognize that the Appellant's typed statement to NCIS in some form admits
culpability, we express grave concern about the lack of detail in the statement, particularly
in light of the fact that NCIS interviewed the Appellant for almost two hours, yet produced a
statement about the incident consisting of a mere 14 lines.
United States v. Lucas, No. 201100372, 2012 CCA Lexis 322, at *12 n.6 (N-M. Ct. Crim.
App. Aug. 28, 2012) (emphasis added). The practice of taking those kinds of short
statements is commonplace in military investigations and the court has not expressed grave
concern about the practice in criminal cases involving outgroup men. But here, in a case
involving an ingroup man, the court expresses grave concern about the practice.
74. Related to this is the idea that if both are drunk, then both should be charged with
rape. E.g. United States v. Redmon, No. 201300077, 2014 CCA LEXIS 369 (N-M Ct. Crim.
App. June 26, 2014) (unpublished).

THE MILITARY'S SEXUAL ASSAULT BLIND SPOT

399

ways (drinking, going to bars without her boyfriend or husband, having
extra-marital sex, wearing provocative clothes) assume the risk.” When we
are dealing with outgroup, deviant rapists, that risk is the risk of rape.
When we are dealing with ingroup, good guys, that risk is the risk of
miscommunication. If a bad, outgroup woman does those things, then a
good, ingroup man can reasonably mistake that behavior as signs of
consent.
Related is the schema that “women often do not clearly say ‘no.’”75
The more extreme version of this is the schema that “Women sometimes
say ‘no’ when they mean ‘yes.’”76 The event schema is that women (both
ingroup and outgroup) will say no or give equivocal signals or offer token
resistance so that the man will not think that they are cheap or easy, and the
good, ingroup man is expected to keep persisting when hearing a weak
“no.” The man is expected to continue in the face of resistance until the
woman screams or fights backthereby clearly communicating her lack of
consent. That is itself another event schema, “Real victims fight back.”77
The reasoning that follows is that if the woman does not follow her script,
then the good, ingroup man can reasonably believe that she consented.
Shifting now to the second part of the hypothesis (the reason a good
guy is under the suspicion is that she really did consent and is lying about it
now), several rape schemas support the hypothesis. The first is, “She asked
for it.”78 This is closely related to the “she assumed the risk (of a mistake)”
schema.79 Instead of being used to show the reasonableness of the man’s
mistake, now the schema is used to show that the woman actually
consented. The proof that she consented is the evidence that she engaged in
non-traditional sexual behavior (drinking, going to bars without her
boyfriend or husband, having a history of extra-marital sex, wearing
provocative clothes) before the event. For the ingroup, this is what
outgroup women do when they want to have consensual sex. If a woman
does those things, she is essentially signaling a blanket consent to sex.80
75. Payne et al., supra note 59, at 50.
76. Id. at 64 (noting the schema types, including those where women actually wanted
the event to occur).
77. Id. at 49–52 (noting multiple examples of responses wherein individuals did not
view an act as rape where the woman did not struggle to defend herself).
78. Id. (showing multiple responses of individuals who view certain actions, such as
dressing suggestively, as the victim being responsible).
79. Id. (noting responses wherein some individuals viewed certain behavior as
implying sexual willingness, such as going to a man’s apartment on a first date).
80. A variant of this applies to ingroup behaviors, too, in that a woman who accepts
dinner and movie from a man in a traditional courtship is now in his sexual debt: by
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The next schema in the reasoning chain is that outgroup women lie
about rape.81 The schema is that an outgroup woman (or a woman soon
to be cast out of the ingroup when this process is over) will often lie
about rape to protect her reputation, her relationships (if this looks like
cheating); her self-esteem (because she regrets the sex or feels cheap);
or because she is crazy or vindictive. 82 When a male decision-maker
looks at one of these fact patterns, he may think, “I have had sex
according to the same script that is in this fact pattern. What if she had
been crazy or vindictive? But for the grace of God go I.”
D. The Entire Flow
Reviewing this discussion from the perspective of those charged
with solving the legal problem, the basic cognitive pathway is
acceptance of traditional gender role beliefs or conservatism, which is
associated with acceptance of these rape schemas. We saw above that
studies connect traditional gender role beliefs and conservatism with the
acceptance of these rape schemas. We should expect that those who
follow this pathway will ultimately resolve the problem in favor of the
man, and research has shown that the acceptance of these rape schemas
is associated with siding with the man in the ultimate normative
judgment about blame. 83
Social science research provides strong evidence of this entire
cognitive pathway, from ingroup identification to the acceptance of
these rape schemas to outcome judgments that favor the man. Some
studies have found a connection directly from the acceptance of
traditional gender role beliefs to the ultimate judgment, skipping the

accepting those things, she signaled her consent to sex. See generally Susan A. Basow &
Alexandra Minieri, “You Owe Me”: Effects of Date Cost, Who Pays, Participant Gender,
and Rape Myth Beliefs on Perceptions of Rape, 26 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 479 (2011).
81. Payne et al., supra note 59, at 49–52 (noting responses where woman lied about
rape in order to cover up other actions, such as an illicit affair).
82. Id.
83. See generally Barbara Krahe, Social Psychological Issues in the Study of Rape, 2
EUR. SOC. PSYCHOL. 279 (1991); G. Tendayi Viki et al., Evaluating Stranger and
Acquaintance Rape: The Role of Benevolent Sexism in Perpetrator Blame and
Recommended Sentence Length, 28 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 295 (2004); Charlene Muehlenhard,
Misinterpreting Dating Behaviors and the Risk of Date Rape, 6 J. SOC. & CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 20 (1988).
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schemas.84 And other studies have found connections across the entire
pathway.85
III. The Rape Schemas Are Inaccurate or Sexist
As discussed above, if the schemas that people use during the
inference process are faulty, then the entire reasoning process is
compromised. The rape schemas we just discussed are faulty. They are
inaccurate or obviously sexist.86
The central rape schema, that rape involves a deviant man who uses
violence and weapons against a woman, is inaccurate. These cases
(stranger rapes) do occur and when they come up they are treated seriously
by the ingroup; however, most rapes do not follow this script. Most
forcible rapes (78–89%) are committed by a man that the woman knows:
friend, acquaintance, current and former date and boyfriend, current and
former husband, employer, fellow employee, father, step-father, uncle.87
Further research shows that a small percentage (6%) of men from the
ingroup commit most rapes.88
The “mistake” schemas are also inaccurate or obviously sexist. For
example, except in rare circumstances, the law does not allow outside
84. See generally Rosanne Proite et al., Gender, Sex-role Stereotypes, and the
Attribution of Responsibility for Date and Acquaintance Rape, 34 J. C. STUDENT DEV. 411
(1993).
85. See generally Viki & Abrams, supra note 57; Abrams et al., supra note 57;
Niwako Yamawaki, Rape Perception and the Function of Ambivalent Sexism and GenderRole Traditionality, 22 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 406 (2007); Szymanski et al., supra
note 57.
86. A complete discussion to prove this claim is beyond the scope of this article, and
many others have attempted to prove that claim. See generally Cultural Myths and Supports
for Rape, supra note 33; Burt, Rape Myths and Acquaintance Rape, supra note 71; Rape
Myths, supra note 26; JOANNA BOURKE, RAPE (2007); Katie M. Edwards et al., Rape Myths:
History, Individual and Institutional-Level Presence, and Implications for Change, 65 SEX
ROLES 761 (2011); Estrich, supra note 29.
87. NATIONAL VICTIM CENTER, supra note 28, at 4; KIPATRICK ET AL., supra note 28, at
30. See generally RAPHAEL, supra note 28, at 89.
88. In a study of 1,882 male college students, David Lisak and Paul Miller found that
6% reported that they had committed rape or attempted rape. David Lisak & Paul A. Miller,
Repeat Rape and Multiple Offending Among Undetected Rapists, 17 VIOLENCE AND VICTIMS
73, 76, 78 (2002). Lisak and Miller also found that a majority of these men were repeat
offenders, such that “a relatively small proportion of men are responsible for a large number
of rapes”. Id. at 80. See also Michele L. Ybarra & Kimberly J. Mitchell, Prevalence Rates
of Male and Female Sexual Violence Perpetrators in a National Sample of Adolescents,
JAMA PEDIATRICS (Oct. 7, 2013), http://archpedi.jamanetwork.com.
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conditions like excitement or intoxication to excuse criminal conduct.
Generally, the only place where excitement mitigates a crime is in
homicide, where murder may be reduced to manslaughter if, for example,
someone catches their spouse in bed with another person or is adequately
provoked by some type of violence coming from the victim.89 Other than
that, the law does not let someone get away with a crime because the person
really wants something: “But the diamond was really pretty and I really,
really wanted it” is not a legal excuse. Likewise, the law does not let a
defendant get away with robbery if he really wants money; asks a woman
for $50; she says she will only give him $25; but he gets really, really
excited and takes the full $50.90
As for alcohol, in common law crimes, voluntary intoxication is a
failure of proof defense, meaning the man needs to be so drunk that he
could not have formed the specific intent required by the crime.91 For
general intent crimes, if a person gets drunk, that person is morally
blameworthy for any harm he causes while drunkfor example, like
somehow missing the indications that he was trespassing. In the common
law, rape is a general intent crime. If a man gets drunk and misses the signs
that the woman has not consented, then any evidence that he was drunk
should not matter. He should still be blameworthy.
The difference in how the law treats these conditions in rape cases
versus how it treats them in other crimes like robbery, murder, or nonsexual assault is due to sexism.92 We are willing to say that these
conditions make conduct or mistakes “reasonable” in sexual assault cases,
but not in others.
The mistake schemas related to a miscommunication between the man
and woman are also inaccurate, exaggerated, or obviously sexist. Looking
first at the schema that a woman asks for it by the way she behaves or
dresses (and so a man can be confused about whether she consented), one
of the corollaries to that schema is that a woman will fight back if she really
does not want sex. If a woman fights back, we assume the man is now on
fair notice that she really means “no.” But we now know that some female
(and male) rape victims experience involuntary nervous system responses
that may prevent them from speaking or moving, much less fighting back. 93
89. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 535–37 (5th ed. 2009).
90. This example has been used in various rape schema debiasing programs.
91. See DRESSLER, supra note 89, at 327.
92. See Estrich, supra note 29, at 1125–26 (providing many examples of differences
like these, where the only plausible explanation for their existence is sexism).
93. See generally Brian M. Marx et al., Tonic Immobility as an Evolved Predator
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One study by Mary Koss and colleagues found that 76.6% of women in
acquaintance rape cases “turned cold.”94 While 69.6% reported that they
struggled somehow (which would not likely be enough to provide fair
notice), only 11.2% screamed or tried to run away.95
The “she asked for it” schema confounds potential for sex with
consent to sex.96 How a woman behaves may give signals as to whether she
might be interested in sex at some point, but in the moment right before the
sexual act, more is required. If someone dresses up to go to an open house
and expresses interest in buying the house to the seller, the seller cannot
then hand the potential buyer a piece of paper saying, “It is now yours at
my asking price.” More is required. Potential for consent does not equal
consent.
Current research on sexual scripts shows that the actual script is much
more complicated than the schema suggests, where women use subtle clues
to communicate consent or lack of consent—and where men also
understand those clues.97 While men may misinterpret behavior and
communication early in the relationship as signals that a romantic
relationship might be an option,98 when they are at the critical moment, they
understand what “no” means.

Defense: Implications for Sexual Assault Survivors, 15 CLINICAL PSYCHOL.: SCI. & PRAC. 74
(2008); Sarah E. Ullman, Reflections on Researching Rape Resistance, 20 VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 343, 347 (2014); Jennifer J. Freyd, What Juries Don't Know:
Dissemination of Research on Victim Response Is Essential for Justice, TRAUMA PSYCHOL.
NEWSL. 15, 15–17 (Fall 2008); Dr. Rebecca Campbell, Webinar on the Neurobiology of
Sexual Assault for the National Institute of Justice (2012), available at
http://www.nsvrc.org/elearning/20044.
94. Mary P. Koss et al., Stranger and Acquaintance Rape: Are There Differences in
the Victim’s Experience?, 12 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 1, 12 tbl.2 (1988).
95. Id.
96. See R. v. Park, 2 S.C.R. 836, 838 (S.C.C. 1995) (“An honest belief that the
complainant would consent is, by itself, not a defense to sexual assault where the accused is
aware of, or willfully blind or reckless as to, lack of consent at the time of the sexual
activity.” (emphasis added)).
97. See Celia Kitzinger & Hannah Frith, Just Say No? The Use of Conversation
Analysis in Developing a Feminist Perspective on Sexual Refusal, 10 DISCOURSE & SOC’Y
293, 293–94 (1999). See generally Hanna Frith & Celia Kitzinger, Talk About Sexual
Miscommunication, 20 WOMEN’S STUD. INT’L FORUM 517 (1997); Hanna Frith & Celia
Kitzinger, Reformulating Sexual Script Theory: Developing a Discursive Psychology of
Sexual Negotiation, 11 THEORY & PSYCHOL. 209 (2001); Rachael O’Byrne et al., “If a Girl
Doesn’t Say ‘No’ . . .”: Young Men, Rape and Claims of ‘Insufficient Knowledge’, 18 J.
COMMUNITY & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 168 (2008).
98. April Bleske-Rechek et al., Benefit or Burden? Attraction in Cross-Sex
Friendship, 29 J. SOC. & PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 569, 575–79 (2012).
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Research suggests that 94% of men understand when a woman has not
consented to sex and they stop.99 In their own experiences, they may have
seen the potential for sex, pursued itmaybe while they were themselves
drunkand later found out through the normal ways that people say “no”
that she did not want sex, and stopped. They may have left the encounter
frustrated, but they did not leave as rapists. The vast majority of men have
not and would not penetrate an unwilling woman. They would never be
Biff from Back to the Future or Bug from Uncle Buck, and they know that
something is wrong when they watch the scenes in those moviesbecause
they understand the signs.
Six percent of men keep going. Remember that in the Koss study,
76.6% of the women turned cold, 69.6% struggled, and 11.2% screamed or
tried to run away. In addition, 83% reasoned or pled with the man—
probably saying things like, “No” and “I don’t want to do this” and “Stop,”
and 45.7% cried or sobbed.100 These women sent pretty clear signals.101
Ninety-four percent of men will not have intercourse with a woman who is
struggling, sobbing, and saying, “stop.” Six percent will, and as Thomas
MacAulay Miller phrases it, “It’s not that they don’t understand, they just
don’t like the answer.”102
The overwhelming majority of both men and women have only had
consensual sexual experiences, where both have known whether consent
was communicated and where both have respected that communication.
This overwhelming majority should have accurate relational schemas103
99. Lisak & Miller, supra note 88, at 78.
100. Koss et al., supra note 94, at 12 tbl.2.
101. Some research exists that advances the idea that up to 40% of women have said
“no” when they mean “yes.” See Charlene L. Muehlenhard & Lisa C. Hollabaugh, Do
Women Sometimes Say No When They Mean Yes? The Prevalence and Correlates of
Women’s Token Resistance to Sex, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 872, 874 (1988).
See also Charlene Muehlenhard & Marcia L. McCoy, Double Standard/Double Blind: The
Sexual Double Standard and Women’s Communication About Sex, 15 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q.
447, 451 (1991); Susan Sprecher, Token Resistance to Sexual Intercourse and Consent to
Unwanted Sexual Intercourse: College Students’ Dating Experiences in Three Countries, 31
J. SEX. RES. 125, 127 (1994). The lead researchers in the area have seriously questioned this
research because, among other things, the instrument used in these studies has serious
validity problems. Charlene L. Muehlenhard & Carie S. Rodgers, Token Resistance to Sex:
New Perspectives on an Old Stereotype, 22 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 443, 448–49, 461–62
(1998).
102. Thomas MacAulay Miller, Mythcommunication: It’s Not That They Don’t
Understand, They Just Don’t Like the Answer, YES MEANS YES (Mar. 21, 2011),
http://yesmeansyesblog.wordpress.com/2011/03/21/mythcommunication-its-not-that-theydont-understand-they-just-dont-like-the-answer/.
103. See generally Mark W. Baldwin, Relational Schemas and the Processing of Social
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based on their own experiences that they can be applied to these legal
problems. Instead, the “mythcommunication” schema perseveres.
This is likely because the basic dating script that leads to the critical
moment—“that men are expected to initiate sexual relations and women are
expected to set the limits on how much sexual activity occurs”104—is
largely unchanged.105 Men and women, for better or for worse, still send
signals that they are interested in someone and potentially interested in sex.
And when an ingroup man takes the risk of making the first move, those in
the ingroup will forgive that first move—even though the “first move” for a
rapist is part of an event schema that is completely different that the one
imagined by the problem solvers.
The last rape schema is that the woman consented and is lying about it
now. Some women do lie about sexual assault and some men are falsely
accused. David Lisak and colleagues reviewed the reliable research in this
area and reported that these studies find that 2.1–10.9% of rape reports are
false,106 where false reports are defined as “a thorough investigation must
yield evidence that a crime did not occur.”107
However, this schema is given much more strength than it deserves. A
man does not run a 2–11% chance of being falsely accused after having
consensual sex. The probability of being falsely accused after having
consensual sex is much, much lower. The probability of being falsely
accused after a consensual sexual encounter is the number of false
allegations divided by the number of consensual sexual encounters.
For example, looking at the military population, the Department of
Defense reported that there were 5,061 sexual assault reports in 2013.108
Applying the Lisak figures would mean that there around 100-500 false
reports. Assume that these accusations all involved consensual sex acts
(and not accusations where no sex acts occurred). There are roughly 1.4
million active-duty service members. Now consider how many consensual

Information, 112 PSYCHOL. BULL. 461 (1992).
104. Antonia Abbey, Alcohol-Related Sexual Assault: A Common Problem Among
College Students, 14 J. STUDIES ON ALCOHOL (SUPPLEMENT 14) 118, 120–21 (2002).
105. See Asia Anna Eaton & Suzanna Rose, Has Dating Become More Egalitarian? A
35 Year Review Using Sex Roles, 64 SEX ROLES 843, 855 (2011) (reporting that traditional
gender stereotypes still remain in place in courtship despite progress in other areas).
106. David Lisak et al., False Allegations of Sexual Assault: An Analysis of Ten Years
of Reported Cases, 16 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1318, 1330 (2010).
107. Id. at 1319.
108. U.S. DEP’T DEFENSE, ANNUAL REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY 2
(2013).
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sex acts those service members had in 2013. Some of them are married or
in long-term relationships, but even if we estimate that there were 500,000
consensual sex acts outside of long-term relationships (the type of cases
that the legal problems solvers are most often called on to judge), 100–500
false reports would be a very, very small percentage of the overall
consensual acts.
The probability that “but for the grace of God go I” is very small, but
the false complaint schema is still powerful and in use.109 This is likely
because false reports are reported as a percentage of all sexual assault
reports (which are themselves a small percentage of all sexual assaults) 110
rather than as raw number or as a percentage of all consensual sexual
encounters.
In addition, when the victim has inconsistencies in her statement and
the problem solver uses the “women lie” schema, the problem solver is
likely to conclude that the woman lied. But we now know that victims have
memory problems that are a direct result of the trauma they experience.
The trauma itself causes problems in the perception of the event, the
recording of those perceptions into memory, and recall of those perceptions,
particularly when victims are interviewed shortly after the event.111 When a
problem solver uses the schema that women lie, those problems of
perception, recording, and recall look like lies or reasons not to believe the
victim rather than as evidence of the trauma itself.
We saw above that if the schemas are faulty, the entire inference
process is compromised. The schemas that people often use in rape cases
are faulty. We also saw that certain ingroups—those with traditional
gender role beliefs and conservatives—hold these schemas at higher levels
than those with the opposite worldviews. This is a problem. Those
ingroups are using an inferential reasoning process that is compromised.
Not surprisingly, we saw that when these ingroups solve legal problems,
they solve them in favor of the man at a higher rate than those with the
opposite worldviews.
109. Overestimating how often two events occur together is called the illusory
correlation. FISKE, supra note 5, at 141.
110. Estimates are that only 5–20% of sexual assaults are reported. Kimberly Lonsway
& Joanne Archambault, The “Justice Gap” for Sexual Assault Cases: Future Directions for
Research and Reform, 18 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 145, 156 (2012). If we use a false
report rate of 10% and a sexual assault reporting rate of 20%, the percentage of false reports
to rape reports would only be .02%.
111. Campbell, supra note 93; Shifting the Paradigm for Investigating Trauma
Victimization, BATTERED WOMEN’S JUSTICE PROJECT (last visited Oct. 14, 2014), available
at http://www.bwjp.org/forensic_experiential_trauma_interviews.aspx.
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That cognitive flow may explain why the military has not made
progress on the sexual assault problem, as critics claim. If the military
population is more traditional or conservative than the general population,
then the military population would likely use those inaccurate schemas at a
higher rate than those in the general population would. The inferential
reasoning problem would be amplified.
IV. Social Cognition, Rape, and the Military
A. Social Cognition in the Military
The military recognizes social cognition principles and has adopted
them into its official decision making process, largely in response to the
problems the military had in Iraq. In 2006, after a tour as a division
commander in Iraq, General David Petraeus took command of the academic
center of the Army, the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas.112 There, he oversaw the redrafting of Army and Marine Corps
counterinsurgency doctrine.113 He recognized that the military did not
understand the operational environment in Iraq, that the military was
fighting an insurgency using tactics designed for conventional wars, and
that the military needed to rethink the way that it thinks.114 The resulting
manual was part of his call for change.
The manual explicitly incorporates social cognition principles:
The way that a culture influences how people view their world is
referred to as their worldview. Many people believe they view their
world accurately, in a logical, rational, unbiased way. However, people
filter what they see and experience according to their beliefs and
worldview. Information and experiences that do not match what they
believe to be true about the world are frequently rejected or distorted to
fit the way they believe the world should work. More than any other
factor, culture informs and influences that worldview. In other words,
culture influences perceptions, understandings, and interpretations of
events.115

112. Peter Bergen, How Petraeus Changed the U.S. Military, CNN (Nov. 11, 2012),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/10/opinion/bergen-petraeus-legacy/.
113. Id.; LINDA ROBINSON, TELL ME HOW THIS ENDS 76–83 (2008).
114. The manual contains a full chapter on understanding the operational environment.
U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-24, INSURGENCIES AND COUNTERING INSURGENCIES,
2-1 (2014).
115. Id. at 3-1 (emphasis added).
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From that paragraph, we see that the military recognizes that cultural
worldviews (i.e., group identities) influence perceptions and interpretations
of events (i.e., outcome judgments) according to beliefs (i.e., schemas).
The military also recognizes that people experience naïve realism, which is
“the notion that one sees the world objectively (even though we suspect that
others may not).”116 Those in the ingroup filter information through their
worldview but believe that they are approaching the problem in a logical,
rational, unbiased way.
In addition to revamping its counterinsurgency doctrine, the military
also changed its official problem solving process. Prior to the shift in
thinking brought about by General Petraeus, the military had been slavishly
following a rigid, formal system called the Military Decision Making
Process. Commanders and their staffs became masters at that system,
seeking discrete inputs and producing beautifully written plansbut these
plans were often designed “to fight the wrong problem.” 117 Having failed
to correctly visualize the current problem at the start of the process,
commanders would “end up fighting the last war.”118
Starting in 2008, the military began to adopt a problem solving process
called “design.”119 Under design methodology, commanders first aim to
understand the current environment (“What is going on?”)120 and they then
visualize the desired end state (“What should the environment look
like?”).121 That frames the problem and helps the commander to produce a
problem statement (“How do we get from here to there?”).122
In this methodology, commanders must understand the operational
environment and the current situation. They do this by using their
“experience, intellect, creativity, intuition, education, [and] judgment.”123

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

FISKE, supra note 5, at 84.
JACK D. KEM, DESIGN: TOOLS OF THE TRADE 63 (2009).
Id.
Id. at 5.
U.S. DEP’T ARMY, ARMY DOCTRINE REFERENCE MANUAL 5-0, THE OPERATIONS
PROCESS 2-6 fig.2-2 (May 17, 2012) [hereinafter ADRP 5-0]; see also U.S. DEP'T ARMY,
ARMY DOCTRINE REFERENCE MANUAL 3-0, UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS 4-1 to 4-2 (May 16,
2012) [hereinafter ADRP 3-0]. While I am primarily citing Army doctrine, this process has
been adopted by the Joint Staff. See JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 5-0, JOINT
OPERATION PLANNING III-2–III-3, III-12 (Aug. 11, 2011) [hereinafter, JOINT PUB. 5-0].
121. ADRP 5-0, supra note 120, at 2-6 fig.2-2.
122. Id.
123. JOINT PUB. 5-0, supra note 120, at III-2; see also ADRP 3-0, supra note 120, at 41.
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In other words, commanders use especially wise generalizations about how
the world works.
Frequently, commanders must rely on event schemas to understanding
the environment:
In a broad sense, a narrative is a story constructed to give meaning to
things and events. Individuals, groups, organizations, and countries all
have narratives with many components that reflect and reveal how they
define themselves. Political parties, social organizations, and
government institutions, for example, all have stories bound
chronologically and spatially . . . . To narrate is to engage in the
production of a story—an explanation of an event or phenomenon by
proposing a question or questions in relation to the artifacts themselves.
These questions may include—What is the meaning of what I see?
Where does the story begin and end? What happened, is happening, and
why?

Narrative construction—the conscious bounding of events and artifacts
in time and space—is central to framing. Commanders, staffs, and unified
action partners construct a narrative to help understand and explain the
operational environment, the problem, and the solutions.124
If the commander’s intuition and knowledge is wrong, or if the
commander is using inaccurate event schemas, then the commander will not
have an accurate understanding of the operational environment. If so, the
commander will not be able to properly frame the problem or visualize the
solution.125
How commanders frame the problem drives the solution that they
choose for that problem. The military provides an example of this in the
context of a combat operation: “How individuals or groups frame a
problem will influence potential solutions. For example, an organization
that frames an insurgent group as ‘freedom fighters’ probably will approach
solving a conflict differently from an organization that frames the insurgent
group as ‘terrorists.’”126
In the sexual assault context, if commanders understand the sexual
assault environment to be one where only deviants rape, they will approach
the problem much differently than if they recognize that the rapists come
from the ingroup. A commander who frames the accused service member
as a good soldier will solve the problem much differently than one who
frames him as a potential rapist.
124.
125.
126.

ADRP 5-0, supra note 120, at 2-5.
Id. at 1-3.
Id. at 2-5.
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If those in the military who handle sexual assault cases are overly
represented by certain worldviews (like traditional gender role beliefs or
conservatism), then those worldviews would likely influence their
perceptions and interpretations of the sexual assault cases that they are
responsible for solving. They will likely be using inaccurate schemas,
particularly event schemas or narrative constructions about what “real” rape
looks like, and this will cause them to improperly frame the problem. And
these problem solvers would likely believe that they are approaching the
problem in a logical, rational, unbiased wayeven if they are not.
B. Traditional Gender Role Beliefs and Conservatism in the Military
Two studies of military populations provide insight into the levels of
traditional gender role beliefs and conservatism in the military. Both
studies gathered data on a narrower sub-population of the militarythe
officers. From these narrow populations come the convening authorities
and policy makers.
First, the Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS) conducted the
Survey on the Military in the Post Cold War Era in 1998 as part of a larger
research project on civil-military relations.127 The researchers sought to
identify and measure differences in belief systems held by the elite military
population, the elite civilian population, and the general population;128 to
explore whether there was a gap in beliefs; and to estimate whether any gap
harmed military effectiveness or civil-military relations.129 The general
concern was that the military (particularly the officer corps) was becoming
increasingly conservative and aligned with the Republican Party and might
otherwise hold contempt for civilian society.130
127. The primary research based on this survey was published in SOLDIERS AND
CIVILIANS: THE CIVIL-MILITARY GAP AND AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY 1-6 (Peter D.
Feaver & Richard H. Kohn, eds., 2001). The RAND Corporation also published a study
based on the data. THOMAS S. SZAYNA ET AL., THE CIVIL-MILITARY GAP IN THE UNITED
STATES: DOES IT EXIST AND WHY? (2007). The original researchers also published a
codebook. JANET NEWCITY, DESCRIPTION OF THE 1998–1999 TISS SURVEYS ON THE
MILITARY IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA 1 (1999) (on file with author). See generally
http://tiss-nc.org/research/the-civil-military-gap/cm-purpose/.
128. NEWCITY, supra note 127, at 1.
129. Triangle Inst. for Sec. Studies, CM Method, http://tiss-nc.org/research/tiss-civilmilitary-relations/cm-method/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2014); Triangle Inst. for Sec. Studies,
CM Purpose, http://tiss-nc.org/research/tiss-civil-military-relations/cm-method/ (last visited
Feb. 27, 2014) http://tiss-nc.org/research/the-civil-military-gap/cm-purpose/.
130. See generally Peter D. Feaver et al., The Gap Between Military and Civilian in the
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The TISS project gathered data from certain military leaders: midcareer officers who were attending staff colleges, more senior officers who
were attending war colleges, and general officers attending a required
course.131 The researchers also gathered data from selected groups of
civilian leaders and from the general civilian population.132
The TISS survey included an item that measured one facet of
traditional gender role expectations: that family labor should be divided
such that women should work at home. The item asked whether mothers
should be encouraged “to stay at home with their children rather than
working outside the home.”133 This item was administered to the sample of
civilian leaders (but not the general public sample) and military leaders. Of
the civilian leaders, 41% agreed strongly or somewhat that women should
be encouraged to stay at home. Of the military leaders, 51% agreed.134 The
data suggests that, at least for this facet of traditional gender role beliefs,
the military leaders are more traditional.
The TISS survey also included an item that asked the respondents to
label themselves along a liberal to conservative spectrum. 135 The
researchers reported the following for the general public non-veterans and
for the military leaders:136

United States in Perspective, in SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS: THE CIVIL-MILITARY GAP AND
AMERICAN NAT’L SEC. 1–2 (Peter D. Feaver & Richard H. Kohn eds., 2001).
131. NEWCITY, supra note 127, at 3–4. The researchers also gathered data on ROTC
and service academy cadets.
132. Id., at 4–5.
133. Id., at 10.
134. Ole R. Holsti, Of Chasms and Convergences: Attitudes and Beliefs of Civilians
and Military Elites at the Start of the New Millennium, in SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS: THE
CIVIL-MILITARY GAP AND AMERICAN NAT’L SEC. 48–49 tbl.1.11 (Peter D. Feaver & Richard
H. Kohn eds., 2001). The researchers reported that the difference was statistically
significant at p < .001.
135. NEWCITY, supra note 127 at 24.
136. Holsti, supra note 134 at 33 tbl.1.4. The researchers report that the difference was
statistically significant at p < .001.

412

21 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 383 (2015)

Table 1: Political self-label comparison, TISS general population nonveteran and military leaders, by percent
Response

General public
non-veterans

Military leaders

Very liberal

7.4

0.3

Somewhat liberal

21.1

4.1

Moderate

27.3

28.4

Somewhat conservative

26.9

53.8

Very conservative

11.5

12.8

Displayed graphically, the difference between the two samples is very
apparent:

Figure 1: Political self-label comparison, TISS general population
non-veteran and military leaders, by percent
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The data suggests that the military leadersthe potential convening
authorities and policy makersare much more conservative than those who
are in the general population who are not themselves veterans.
In the second study, conducted in 2004, Jason Dempsey surveyed the
active duty Army population looking for answers to the same basic
questions posed by the TISS researchers.137 Unlike the TISS survey, which
only looked at selected ranks, Dempsey surveyed the entire rank population
with a few minor exceptions.138 Another significant difference between his
study and the TISS study is that he only looked at the Army population
while the TISS survey looked at all branches of service.
Dempsey included a gender-role item in his study. He chose his item
language because it was used in the 2004 National Annenberg Election
Survey and he wanted to make direct comparisons between his sample and
samples taken from the general population.139 The item language is:
“Some people feel that women should have an equal role with men in
running business, industry, and government. Others feel that the woman’s
place is in the home. Where would you place yourself on a scale from 1
being an equal role for women and 7 being a woman’s place is in the
home?” Dempsey reports that 60% of the civilian population (sampled in
the Annenberg survey) fully agreed that women should have an equal role,
while only 49% of Army officers in his sample fully agreed.140
Dempsey also included an item that asked the respondents to label
themselves along a liberal to conservative spectrum. He found that the
entire Army population looked very much like the general public; 141
however, he also found that “the similarity between the general American
population and the army population masks two very different populations in
the Army data set. One is heavily conservative but relatively small (the
officer corps), and the other is more moderate and liberal but much larger
(the enlisted ranks).”142 Comparing the responses from the officers in his
sample to the sample of the general public used in the Annenberg sample,
he reported:143

137. See generally JASON K. DEMPSEY, OUR ARMY: SOLDIERS, POLITICS, AND AMERICAN
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS (2010).
138. Id., at 6.
139. .
Id., at 240 app. C.
140. Id. at 62.
141. Id. at 74–75.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 74 tbl.5.2; see also id. at 75 tbl.5.3. Dempsey reported that the differences
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Table 2: Political self-label comparison, Dempsey general population
and Army officers, by percent
Response

General public

Army officers

Liberal

24

14

Moderate

39

23

Conservative

37

63

Displayed graphically, the difference between the two samples becomes
very apparent:

Figure 2: Political self-label comparison, Dempsey general
population and Army officers, by percent
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The data suggests that the Army officer populationthe population that
produces the potential convening authorities and strategic policy
makersis much more conservative than the general population.

were statistically significant at p < .001.
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Both studies suggest that the military population that makes the
decisions on military justice and sets sexual assault policy is much more
traditional than the general public, at least toward one facet of traditional
gender role beliefs,144 and more conservative than the general population.
As discussed above, research indicates that people with those worldviews
are more likely to use inaccurate rape schemas when solving sexual assault
problems. This suggests that the problem of a compromised inferential
reasoning processthe use of inaccurate rape schemas which results in
untrustworthy outcome judgmentsis exacerbated in this population within
this military community.
C. Examples of the Use of Rape Schemas in the Military
The data from those two studies suggests that the population that
produces convening authorities and strategic policy makers is more
traditional and conservative than the general public. Other research
suggests that those who are traditional and conservative subscribe to
inaccurate rape schemas at a higher rate that those who have the opposite
worldview. In addition to that inferential reasoning problem, and it may
144. Regina Titunik has concluded that the TISS data shows that the military
population is not more sexist that the general population. Regina F. Titunik, The Myth of the
Macho Military, 40 POLITY 137, 144–45 (2008). This part of the TISS study was discussed
in Laura L. Miller & John Allen Williams, Do Military Policies on Gender and Sexuality
Undermine Combat Effectiveness?, in SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS: THE CIVIL-MILITARY GAP
AND AMERICAN NAT’L SEC. 361, 366–77 (Peter D. Feaver & Richard H. Kohn eds., 2001).
Titunik looked at items in the TISS study that explored whether the military should remain
dominated by male values; confidence levels in female leaders; whether women should be
allowed to serve in all combat positions; and whether there was more sexual discrimination
in the military than in the public realm. Titunik, supra note 144, at 145–47. In general, the
general public appeared to have more traditional attitudes than the military population.
However, the reliability and validity of this part of the TISS study has been called into
question because the differences in responses may have been due to “the respondents’
knowledge about the issues studied and the importance to place on them.” SZAYNA ET AL.,
supra note 127, at 62. The questions related to specific policy issues and those in the
military may have had direct knowledge and experience with those issues while the general
public may have responded based on conjecture or beliefs.
In addition, because these items were very narrowexploring attitudes in the military
contextthe military respondents may have also been influenced by a social desirability
bias that would not have influenced the general public respondents. Social desirability bias
occurs when respondents answer an item in a way that “presents themselves in the most
favorable manner relative to prevailing social norms”. Maryon F. King & Gordon C.
Bruner, Social Desirability Bias: A Neglected Aspect of Validity Testing, 17 PSYCHOLOGY &
MKTG. 79, 80 (2000). A military respondent who answers with what appears to be a sexist
response would be running against the norms professed by the military leadership.
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turn out that some of these inaccurate schemas are amplified within the
military context.
The schema that only deviants rape (and good guys do not) is greatly
intensified in the military:
Some social scientists have noted that considering the “character and
military service of the accused” when deciding the disposition of a
sexual assault allegation may be based on false beliefs about who
perpetrates sexual assault. They argue that sexual predators are adept at
being likeable to authority figures and are “such masters of the ‘hidden
persona’ . . . that their colleagues and commanders are often happy to
offer positive character testimony to investigators and courtsmartial.” . . . [M]ore than a decade of war has led military leaders to
value achievement in combat above all other characteristics, and that
this has created a situation where commanders tend to overlook or
tolerate sexually abusive conduct among subordinates.145

Not only is the offender a member of the ingroup, he may be a hero within
the ingroup.
This schema played a large role in the recent reversal of the conviction
of an Air Force pilot. The pilot, Lieutenant Colonel James Wilkerson, had
been convicted by a court-martial composed of panel members of sexually
assaulting a guest at his house.146 The convening authority, Lieutenant
General Craig Franklin, overturned the panel’s findings. In a letter to the
Secretary of the Air Force, General Franklin explained his reasoning:
I was perplexed in relation to this conundrumLt Col Wilkerson was a
selectee for promotion to full colonel, a wing inspector general, a career
officer, and described as a doting father and husband. However,
according to the version of events presented by the prosecution, Lt Col
Wilkerson, in the middle of the night, decided to leave his wife sleeping
in his bed, walk downstairs past the room of his only son, and also near
another room with two other sleeping guest-children, and then he
decided to commit the egregious crime of sexually assaulting a sleeping
woman who he and his wife had only met earlier that night. 147

145. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 66 (internal citations omitted).
146. Craig Whitlock, Air Force General’s Reversal of Pilot’s Sexual-Assault
Conviction Angers Lawmakers, THE WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 8, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/air-force-generals-reversal-ofpilots-sexual-assault-conviction-angers-lawmakers/2013/03/08/f84b49c2-8816-11e2-8646d574216d3c8c_story.html.
147. Letter from Lieutenant General Craig Franklin, Commander, Third Air Force, to
Secretary of the Air Force Michael Donley 6 (Mar. 12, 2013), available at
http://www.foia.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-130403-022.pdf).
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General Franklin was perplexed (as in, he experienced cognitive
dissonance) because his schema of a rapist did not match the information he
received about Colonel Wilkerson. That schema prevented General
Franklin from understanding the operating environment.
A recent military appellate case also illustrates the power of the “only
deviants rape” schema. In United States v. Lucas,148 a service member was
convicted of rape by court-martial composed of panel members. In the
military, the first level of appellate courts (composed of military judge
advocates) can make independent factual findings and decide for itself
whether the accused is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.149 Here, the
military appellate court reversed that panel’s finding and dismissed the
charge with prejudice.150
The court in Lucas reversed the panel’s decision in large part because
the judges used the “only deviants rape” schema. The court stated, “We
find that the explanations [the accused] gave to the [investigator] regarding
the events . . . are believable, especially considering the evidence of his
good military character and service history admitted at sentencing.”151 In
the military, evidence of good military character can be admitted during the
guilt-phase of the trial to prove that the accused did not commit the
offense.152 Even so, the court should not have used evidence admitted
during the sentencing proceeding to decide a guilt-phase questionbut that
evidence was inconsistent with a powerful schema (only deviants rape) and
this court could not avoid the temptation to use it. According to this court,
those with good military character are not deviants and so do not rape. At
the very least, they tell the truth to investigators.

148. See generally United States v. Lucas, No. 201100372, 2012 CCA Lexis 322 (N-M.
Ct. Crim. App. Aug. 28, 2012).
149. See UCMJ art. 66(c) (2012). (Stating that the service courts of criminal appeal
“may affirm only such findings of guilt . . . as it finds correct in law and fact . . . In
considering the record, it may weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, and
determine controverted questions of fact, recognizing that the trial court saw and heard the
evidence”).
150. Lucas, 2012 CCA Lexis 322, at *2.
151. Id. at *12.
152. See Elizabeth Lutes Hillman, The “Good Soldier” Defense: Character Evidence
and Military Rank at Courts-Martial, 108 YALE L.J. 879 (1999). This exception, which
essentially serves as pipeline for evidence that supports the schema that only deviants rape,
is under serious Congressional scrutiny. This exception will close for sexual assault offenses
under either of two current proposals. S. Res. 2410, 113th Cong. § 545(g) (2014); H.R. Res.
4435, 113th Cong. § 537 (2014). The issue is whether it this evidence will be allowed for
other offenses.
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Turning to schemas related to whether the woman actually consented
and so must be lying about it now, these schemas also appear to still be in
use in the military. One the schemasthat real victims fight backis
likely amplified in the military. Most service members, including women,
receive training on how to fight in close quarters. The amplified schema
here would be, real victims fight back, especially when they have received
training in how to fight.
Returning to Lucas, we find that reasoning. The court stated, “It is
illogical to believe that a man weighing just over 200 pounds could
accomplish [the rape] against a female Marine, trained in Marine Corps
Martial Arts, weighing 155 pounds, under the circumstances as described in
the record before us.”153 If she were a real victim, she would have fought
back; she did not, so she must have consented and is lying about it now.
It is illogical to believe that a real victim trained in martial arts would
not fight backif you apply incorrect schemas. If you apply schemas that
are informed by neuropsychology, it makes perfect sense. In these kinds of
sexual assaults, the woman is often not aware that she is in danger. She is
not on patrol, adrenaline pumping, anticipating an attack from the enemy
that might end in a close-quarters knife fight. In those situations, knowing
martial arts might be useful. In a sexual assault case where the woman
trusts the person she is with and is not anticipating danger, the attack will
likely be over before the woman understands what just happened. Here, the
court expected a 155-pound woman to use martial arts against a 207-pound
Marine Corps non-commissioned officer who, by the way, was also trained
in martial arts, when his brain was ready for the assault and hers was not.
That is illogical.
The schema that women frequently lie about sexual assault is still
officially endorsed by the military. In 2012, the Department of the Army
published Army 2020: Generating Health & Discipline in the Force,154 an
exhaustive report on health and crime in the Army. The tone of the portion
of the report that dealt with misconduct was about cracking down on
misconduct committed by people whom we would consider to be outgroup
service membersthose who use drugs, go absent without leave, steal,
commit assaults.

153.
154.

Lucas, 2012 CCA Lexis 322, at *9.
U.S. DEP’T ARMY, ARMY 2020: GENERATING HEALTH & DISCIPLINE IN THE FORCE
AHEAD OF THE STRATEGIC RESET (2012), available at http://www.usagria.army.mil/docs/
GoldBook.pdf [hereinafter, ARMY 2020].
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In the discussion of sexual assault, however, the tone changes. The
authors tell us that:
Consistent with the civilian literature, reporting of sexual offenses
(particularly for rape and aggravated sexual assault) include both
legitimate and false allegations. A review of FBI data for sexual assaults
across a seven‐year period found that approximately 25% of sexual
assaults referred to the FBI involved false allegations (based on post‐
arrest and post‐conviction DNA exonerations).155

Note that those figures apply to stranger sexual assaults. In non-stranger
sexual assault, identity (and DNA evidence) is not an issue. Stranger sexual
assault is not the problem facing the military. The authors of this section do
not appear to understand the problem.156
The authors then cite discredited research to report that 23–50% of
rape allegations are false157 and then tell us why women lie about rape:
“The same article posited several key motivations behind false allegations,
including: (1) a need for an alibi to compensate for problems arising from
consensual sex, (2) in retribution for a perceived wrong such as rejection or
betrayal, and (3) to satisfy a need for attention or other material gain.”158
The authors then continue by reporting that the “veracity of the complaint
must be questioned to preserve the presumption of innocence because ‘sex
crimes are the only crimes that do not require corroborating evidence for
conviction.’” 159 The last part of that statement is simply inaccurate, and the
authors do not make a similar point about the credibility of people who
allege theft or simple assault or any other crimes.
In contrast to the authors’ treatment of other crimes, where the focus is
on catching and convicting outgroup service members, in the sexual assault
context, the focus is how women lie about sexual assault. When offenders
otherwise look super-ingroup (they are good soldiers), the ingroup needs a
really good explanation for why so many from the ingroup are being
accused of sexual assault. The Army’s top law enforcement officials
155. Id. at 128.
156. This section is inconsistent with earlier portions of the report, where the authors
otherwise seem to understand the environment. The authors identified trends about when
these assaults occur and who the victims are, and, importantly, that almost all of the sexual
assaults in the Army involve an offender that is known to the victim. ARMY 2020, supra
note 154,at 124–25. This last finding does not seem to have had much impact on the rest of
the report.
157. Id. at 128–29.
158. Id. at 128.
159. Id. at 128.
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explanation is that upward of half of the women are lying. The Army’s top
law enforcement officials do not understand the problem.
The Franklin letter, the Lucas case, and the Army report are anecdotes
and are low-hanging fruit at that. General Franklin, the judges in Lucas,
and the authors of the Army report obviously used inaccurate rape
schemas.160 But they all serve as contemporary examples of how these rape
schemas operate with greater intensity in the military, and they serve as
examples of how many in the military who are charged with solving these
problems cannot properly frame these problems. They do not understand
the current conditions of the operational environment and so cannot
visualize the proper end state. They have a cognitive blind spot.
V. Conclusion and Policy Implications
This article suggests that the military populations that produce
convening authorities and policy makers are overrepresented by people who
are traditional and conservative. Other research has shown that those
ingroups use inaccurate rape schemas to solve sexual assault problems at a
higher rate than those with other worldviews. And research has shown that
those ingroups choose outcome judgments that favor the man more than
those with other worldviews. They cannot visualize what is happening
during these assaults. They do not understand the operating environment.
They have a blind spot.
This article suggests that some of the criticisms of the military’s
handling of sexual assault cases are accuratethat those who handle these
cases follow a cognitive process that seeks to rationalize why a good,
ingroup man would be accused of sexual assault and that explains away
why an outgroup woman would accuse him of sexual assault. The research
suggests that this problem is not based on hostile sexism, though; rather, it
is likely based on benign sexism related to traditional gender role beliefs,
particularly beliefs about how women should behave sexually.
There are three basic proposals for reform.161 One is that we give
these cases to civilian law enforcement. However, giving these cases to
160. The Franklin letter and the Lucas opinion contain many other instances where the
authors used inaccurate rape schemas.
161. Other proposals do exist but do not have much likelihood of gaining traction. For
example, one recent House resolution included a provision that these cases bypass the
commander and automatically be referred to a courts-martial. Holley Lynn James Act, H.R.
1517, 112th Cong. § 3(a) (2011).
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other civilian law enforcement agencies will not likely change anything.
Many other law enforcement jurisdictions are also under serious
criticism.162 These other law enforcement agencies may have populations
that are very similar to the military population and may rely on the same
schemas.
The second is that we give these cases to someone outside of the chain
of command, either a military prosecutor from outside of that chain of
command,163 an independent military convening authority,164 or
independent director of prosecution within the Department of Defense.165
The rationale is that this will erase the potential conflict of interest that a
convening authority faces when the accused and victim both come from the
convening authority’s command. However, giving these decisions to
military lawyers or independent convening authorities will not likely
change anything. The ingroup/outgroup distinction is not based on what
unit the accused or the victim belong to; rather, the distinction is based on
what social group they belong to.
Further, we can infer that these military lawyers and this other
convening authority are also likely traditional and conservative and so will
use these inaccurate rape schemas. In addition, many of these lawyers
served as defense counsel in sexual assault cases (in the military, it is
common practice for judge advocates to serve as both prosecutors and
defense counsel). As defense counsel, they probably reinforced preexisting rape schemas as they defended these cases. They may not be able
to unlearn those cognitive processes. The military lawyers may be the
worst option.

162. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CAPITOL OFFENSE: POLICE MISHANDLING OF
SEXUAL ASSAULT CASES IN THE DIST. OF COLUMBIA (2013); Cassia Spohn & Katharine
Tellis, Justice Denied? The Exceptional Clearance of Rape Cases in Los Angeles, 74 ALB. L.
REV. 1379 (2011); Corey Rayburn Yung, How to Lie with Rape Statistics: America’s Hidden
Rape Crisis, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1197 (2014) (highlighting Baltimore, New Orleans,
Philadelphia, St. Louis, Atlanta, Dallas, Milwaukee, Mobile, Oakland, and Washington,
D.C.).
163. Military Justice Improvement Act of 2013, S. Res. 1752, 113th Cong. § 2(a)
(2013). After a fairly public battle, this bill fell five votes short of the 60 required to defeat a
filibuster. Amanda Marcotte, What Happened to the Military Sexual Assault Bill in the
Senate on Thursday?, SLATE (Mar. 7, 2014, 10:57 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/
xx_factor/2014/03/07/military_sexual_assault_bills_claire_mccaskill_defeats_kirsten_gillibran
d.html.
164. COMM’N. OF CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 67.
165. Sexual Assault Training Oversight & Prevention Act, H.R. 1593, 113th Cong.
§ 5(a) (2013).
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The third option is to keep the status quo. A bill that recently passed
the Senate would require the military to ask the victim whether she wanted
the case to go to court-martial or a civilian jurisdiction, and then to give that
preference great weightbut preserves the status quo.166 Under this option,
commanders will continue to make decisions likely using inaccurate rape
schemas, while receiving advice from lawyers who are likely using
inaccurate rape schemas, and the victim’s only other option is to take the
case to civilian law enforcement officials who are likely using inaccurate
rape schemas.
Real reform requires that the people who resolve these legal problems
do so without the influence of these rape schemas. We could choose to
keep the current structurebut only if we could commit to intensively
training each general court-martial convening authority and his or her staff
judge advocate and then certifying that they are free of these schemas. We
could choose to use centralized decision makersbut only if they are
certified as free of these schemas. We could choose to let local law
enforcement offices handle these casesbut only if the people in those
offices are free of these schemas.
The decision then turns on which is the most efficient system.
Congress cannot likely fund and supervise the training of every local law
enforcement office. Centralized decision makers will likely greatly
increase transaction costsprimarily, case-processing times. The best
solution may be to keep the current structure but to require that general
courts-martial convening authorities and staff judge advocates be certified
after having gone through intensive (probably multi-day) training on the
realities of sexual assault.
The findings from this study go beyond just these commanders and
their lawyers. These findings also suggest that the entire population that
handles these cases (investigators, trial attorneys, trial and appellate judges,
panel members) may be more likely to use this cognitive processing than
members of the general public. All of these actors should be trained and
certified before being allowed to act on these cases. With this training and
certification, Congress could reach the ultimate goala system that is free
of inaccurate schemas, not just one that is no worse than the others around.

166.
(2013).

See generally Victims Protection Act of 2014, S. Res. 1917, 113th Cong. § 3

